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rm mischaracterization of source; Kersten & Hankel give general definition of right-wing ideologies without applying them to specific countries; sub-chapter about Ukraine begins on p. 91
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During Ukraine's post-Soviet history, the far-right has remained on the political periphery and been largely excluded from national politics since [[Declaration of Independence of Ukraine|independence in 1991]].<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak1>Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: ''The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine''. In: ''The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right'' (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 1―2, [[doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30]].</ref>{{sfn|Likhachev|2018|p=1}} Unlike most [[Eastern Europe|Eastern European]] countries which saw far-right groups become permanent fixtures in their countries' politics during the decline and fall of the [[Soviet Union]], the national electoral support for far-right parties in Ukraine only rarely exceeded 3% of the popular vote.<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak2>Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: ''The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine''. In: ''The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right'' (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 2, [[doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30]].</ref> Far-right parties usually enjoyed just a few wins in single-mandate districts, and no far right candidate for president has ever secured more than 5 percent of the popular vote in an election.<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak2/> Only once in the 1994–2014 period was a radical right-wing party elected to the parliament as an independent organization within the proportional part of the voting: [[Svoboda (political party)|Svoboda]] in 2012.<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak2/> Since then even at the height of nationalist sentiment during and after [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|Russia's annexation of Crimea]] and the [[Russo-Ukrainian War]] far-right parties have failed to gain enough votes to attain political representation.<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak2/>
During Ukraine's post-Soviet history, the far-right has remained on the political periphery and been largely excluded from national politics since [[Declaration of Independence of Ukraine|independence in 1991]].<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak1>Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: ''The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine''. In: ''The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right'' (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 1―2, [[doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30]].</ref>{{sfn|Likhachev|2018|p=1}} Unlike most [[Eastern Europe|Eastern European]] countries which saw far-right groups become permanent fixtures in their countries' politics during the decline and fall of the [[Soviet Union]], the national electoral support for far-right parties in Ukraine only rarely exceeded 3% of the popular vote.<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak2>Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: ''The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine''. In: ''The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right'' (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 2, [[doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30]].</ref> Far-right parties usually enjoyed just a few wins in single-mandate districts, and no far right candidate for president has ever secured more than 5 percent of the popular vote in an election.<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak2/> Only once in the 1994–2014 period was a radical right-wing party elected to the parliament as an independent organization within the proportional part of the voting: [[Svoboda (political party)|Svoboda]] in 2012.<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak2/> Since then even at the height of nationalist sentiment during and after [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|Russia's annexation of Crimea]] and the [[Russo-Ukrainian War]] far-right parties have failed to gain enough votes to attain political representation.<ref name=Mierzejewski-Voznyak2/>


In the [[2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election]] the coalition if Svoboda and the other right-wing political parties in Ukraine ― [[National Corps]], the [[Governmental Initiative of Yarosh]], and the [[Right Sector]] ― won only 2.15% of the vote combined and failed to pass the 5% threshold it gained no parliamentary seats.<ref>Aram Terzyan: [https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/new-eurasian-far-right-rising ''Towards Democratic Consolidation? Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity'']. ''Open Political Science'', 2020; 3: 183–191, p. 186. [[doi:0.1515/openps-2020-0015]]</ref><ref name="2748306-cecNC"/> No far-right parties gained seats in the [[Verkhovna Rada]] (Ukraine's parliament), as they all failed to win any single-mandate constituency seat.<ref name="2748306-cecNC">[https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-elections/2748306-cec-counts-100-percent-of-vote-in-ukraines-parliamentary-elections.html CEC counts 100 percent of vote in Ukraine's parliamentary elections], [[Ukrinform]] (26 July 2019)<br>{{in lang|ru}} [https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2019/07/21/7221526/ Results of the extraordinary elections of the People's Deputies of Ukraine 2019], [[Ukrayinska Pravda]] (21 July 2019)</ref>
In the [[2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election]] the coalition Svoboda and the other right-wing political parties in Ukraine ― [[National Corps]], the [[Governmental Initiative of Yarosh]], and the [[Right Sector]] ― won only 2.15% of the vote combined and failed to pass the 5% threshold.<ref>Aram Terzyan: [https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/new-eurasian-far-right-rising ''Towards Democratic Consolidation? Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity'']. ''Open Political Science'', 2020; 3: 183–191, p. 186. [[doi:0.1515/openps-2020-0015]]</ref><ref name="2748306-cecNC"/> No far-right parties gained seats in the [[Verkhovna Rada]] (Ukraine's parliament), as they all failed to win any single-mandate constituency seat.<ref name="2748306-cecNC">[https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-elections/2748306-cec-counts-100-percent-of-vote-in-ukraines-parliamentary-elections.html CEC counts 100 percent of vote in Ukraine's parliamentary elections], [[Ukrinform]] (26 July 2019)<br>{{in lang|ru}} [https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2019/07/21/7221526/ Results of the extraordinary elections of the People's Deputies of Ukraine 2019], [[Ukrayinska Pravda]] (21 July 2019)</ref>


==Social and economic background==
==Social and economic background==
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National attitudes about the far-right are impacted by the ambivalent role Ukraine played during [[Nazi]] occupation, with Ukrainians volunteering in [[SS]] troops and as [[concentration camp]] guards.{{sfn|Kersten|Hankel|2013|p=91, 92}}
National attitudes about the far-right are impacted by the ambivalent role Ukraine played during [[Nazi]] occupation, with Ukrainians volunteering in [[SS]] troops and as [[concentration camp]] guards.{{sfn|Kersten|Hankel|2013|p=91, 92}}

Right-wing ideology in Ukraine has strong currents of [[racism]], [[xenophobia]], [[anti-Semitism]], [[authoritarianism]], [[anti-parliamentarianism]], and [[ethnonationalism]]. This abstract concept is often associated with a denial of the [[Holocaust]] and ignoring of genocidal politics of [[Adolf Hitler]], [[Nazi Germany]] and [[National Socialism]].{{sfn|Kersten|Hankel|2013|p=86}}


According to a 2018 report by the [[Non-governmental organization|NGO]] [[Freedom House]] far-right groups have been marginal in Ukrainian society and especially in Ukrainian politics. The report identifies three political parties in Ukraine which qualify as extremist ― Svoboda, National Corps and Right Sector. None of the three parties obtained enough votes to gain parliamentary representation. The report argues that due to the far right's weakness in official politics right-wing groups have sought avenues outside of politics to impose their agenda on Ukrainian society, including attempts to disrupt peaceful assemblies and use force against those with opposite political and cultural views such as left-wing, feminist, LGBT, and human rights activists. The report concludes that while such groups do not have the capabilities to challenge the state, they pose a threat to Ukrainian democracy because they reject democratic values yet actively employ all spectrum of the opportunities offered by democracy. One particular area of concern according to the report is that Ukrainian law enforcement has failed to stop far-right disruptions and such activities have gone unpunished. The report calls on Ukrainian authorities to take more effective measures.{{sfn|Likhachev|2018|p=1}}
According to a 2018 report by the [[Non-governmental organization|NGO]] [[Freedom House]] far-right groups have been marginal in Ukrainian society and especially in Ukrainian politics. The report identifies three political parties in Ukraine which qualify as extremist ― Svoboda, National Corps and Right Sector. None of the three parties obtained enough votes to gain parliamentary representation. The report argues that due to the far right's weakness in official politics right-wing groups have sought avenues outside of politics to impose their agenda on Ukrainian society, including attempts to disrupt peaceful assemblies and use force against those with opposite political and cultural views such as left-wing, feminist, LGBT, and human rights activists. The report concludes that while such groups do not have the capabilities to challenge the state, they pose a threat to Ukrainian democracy because they reject democratic values yet actively employ all spectrum of the opportunities offered by democracy. One particular area of concern according to the report is that Ukrainian law enforcement has failed to stop far-right disruptions and such activities have gone unpunished. The report calls on Ukrainian authorities to take more effective measures.{{sfn|Likhachev|2018|p=1}}

Revision as of 00:50, 9 December 2021

Ukrainian volunteer battalion members with neo-Nazi Wolfsangel symbol, 24 July 2014

Far-right politics in Ukraine refers to the actions, organizations, and beliefs of the far-right in Ukraine. In the recent years it has been closely related to an increased level of extreme far-right ideology promoting neo-nazism, white supremacy, antisemitism and xenophobia in Ukraine.[1] There is a growing body of evidence of civil freedom violations, bans on books, violence of far-right extremists, ultranationalism, neo-Nazi pogroms of ethnic communities such as Roma people, attacks on feminists and LGBT minorities, and officially sponsored glorification of Nazi collaborators.[2]

During Ukraine's post-Soviet history, the far-right has remained on the political periphery and been largely excluded from national politics since independence in 1991.[3][4] Unlike most Eastern European countries which saw far-right groups become permanent fixtures in their countries' politics during the decline and fall of the Soviet Union, the national electoral support for far-right parties in Ukraine only rarely exceeded 3% of the popular vote.[5] Far-right parties usually enjoyed just a few wins in single-mandate districts, and no far right candidate for president has ever secured more than 5 percent of the popular vote in an election.[5] Only once in the 1994–2014 period was a radical right-wing party elected to the parliament as an independent organization within the proportional part of the voting: Svoboda in 2012.[5] Since then even at the height of nationalist sentiment during and after Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Russo-Ukrainian War far-right parties have failed to gain enough votes to attain political representation.[5]

In the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election the coalition of Svoboda and the other right-wing political parties in Ukraine ― National Corps, the Governmental Initiative of Yarosh, and the Right Sector ― won only 2.15% of the vote combined and failed to pass the 5% threshold.[6][7] No far-right parties gained seats in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament), as they all failed to win any single-mandate constituency seat.[7]

Social and economic background

Schutzmannschaft with Nazi uniform and the Ukrainian Coat of arms, 1943

The far-right in Ukraine is not identical with Ukrainian nationalism which resulted in part from Ukraine being historically divided between various imperial powers.[8] Post-Soviet Ukraine is home to competing nationalisms and cultural orientations. The nationalist organizations during World War II remain controversial.[9]

National attitudes about the far-right are impacted by the ambivalent role Ukraine played during Nazi occupation, with Ukrainians volunteering in SS troops and as concentration camp guards.[10]

According to a 2018 report by the NGO Freedom House far-right groups have been marginal in Ukrainian society and especially in Ukrainian politics. The report identifies three political parties in Ukraine which qualify as extremist ― Svoboda, National Corps and Right Sector. None of the three parties obtained enough votes to gain parliamentary representation. The report argues that due to the far right's weakness in official politics right-wing groups have sought avenues outside of politics to impose their agenda on Ukrainian society, including attempts to disrupt peaceful assemblies and use force against those with opposite political and cultural views such as left-wing, feminist, LGBT, and human rights activists. The report concludes that while such groups do not have the capabilities to challenge the state, they pose a threat to Ukrainian democracy because they reject democratic values yet actively employ all spectrum of the opportunities offered by democracy. One particular area of concern according to the report is that Ukrainian law enforcement has failed to stop far-right disruptions and such activities have gone unpunished. The report calls on Ukrainian authorities to take more effective measures.[4]

Far right violence

Ukrainian Right Sector extremists wearing the Nazi symbolic on Maidan. 2014

Regular torchlight marches by members of the Ukrainian far-right have drawn comparisons to those in Germany after World War I and Ukrainian authorities have faced widespread criticism for their perceived inaction in the face of far-right crime. Repeated attempts by authorities to memorialize Ukrainian nationalist leaders who collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II have also drawn criticism.[2][11]

Ukraine's hate crime rate until 2005 was not notably higher than other similar nations. Its growth seems to be caused by raise of informal youth groups, in particular skinheads who assaulted “non Slavic” people while using "Nazi slogans".[12] According to statistics collected on antisemitic vandalism these activities are on the rise, in the first three months of 2018 extremists tried to disrupt at least twelve different public events and attacked a variety of targets.[13] Reportedly, the Ukrainian justice system keeps to classifies right-wing terrorism as acts of hooliganism, including, for example, a 2009 failed bomb attack on a Jewish Center.[14]

Military units

According to American scientist Stephen F. Cohen in 2018 the resurrection of Nazi ideology could be observed all around the globe, including Europe and the United States. But he believes that the growing Ukrainian Neo-Nazi movement poses a special danger due to its well-armed and well-organized nature in a political center of the Second Cold War.[11] Cohen also mentioned the Azov battalion as a manifestation of the resurgence of Ukrainian Neo-Nazism.[11]

British scholar Richard Sakwa pointed out that the Ukrainian National Guard units, manned by far right militants "often lacked discipline and treated south-east Ukraine as occupied territory, regularly committing atrocities against civilians and captured ‘terrorists’".[15]

In the media

Despite the fact that far-right parties in Ukraine have been unpopular with the electorate and received considerably less support than far-right parties in other European countries, the Russian government and media started to label Ukraine a "fascist state" following the Orange Revolution in 2004.[3] The subject of the far right's alleged influence in Ukraine became especially politicized during the 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity when small radical groups without political influence received disproportionate media attention not only in Russia but also in the West. The impact of these and similar organizations on both Ukrainian politics and society has since been greatly exaggerated in Russian state media and also in some West European journalistic accounts.[5]

Media coverage has been focused largely on Svoboda party whose members stand accused of killing four national guardsmen using hand grenades during a rally outside Ukrainian parliament in August 2015.[16]

Major Political parties and Groups

Defunct Political parties and Groups

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Michael Colborne Why Does No One Care That Neo-Nazis Are Gaining Power In Ukraine?, forward.com, 2018
  2. ^ a b Lev Golinkin Neo-Nazis and the Far Right Are On the March in Ukraine, The Nation, February 2019
  3. ^ a b Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 1―2, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  4. ^ a b Likhachev 2018, p. 1.
  5. ^ a b c d e Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 2, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  6. ^ Aram Terzyan: Towards Democratic Consolidation? Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity. Open Political Science, 2020; 3: 183–191, p. 186. doi:0.1515/openps-2020-0015
  7. ^ a b CEC counts 100 percent of vote in Ukraine's parliamentary elections, Ukrinform (26 July 2019)
    (in Russian) Results of the extraordinary elections of the People's Deputies of Ukraine 2019, Ukrayinska Pravda (21 July 2019)
  8. ^ Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 12, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  9. ^ Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 13, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  10. ^ Kersten & Hankel 2013, p. 91, 92.
  11. ^ a b c Stephen F. Cohen America’s Collusion With Neo-Nazis. Neo-fascists play an important official or tolerated role in US-backed Ukraine The Nation, 2018
  12. ^ Kersten & Hankel 2013, p. 93.
  13. ^ Likhachev 2018, p. 4.
  14. ^ Kersten & Hankel 2013, p. 93, 94.
  15. ^ Sakwa 2015, p. 159,160.
  16. ^ Paul Funder Larsen Right-wing nationalists under investigation after last year’s sniper massacre in Kiev Jyllands-Posten, 2015

References

  • Kersten, Joachim; Hankel, Natalia (2013). "A comparative look at right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobic hate crimes in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia". Right-Wing Radicalism Today. ISBN 978-0-415-62723-8.
  • Likhachev, Vyacheslav (2018). Far-right Extremism as a Threat to Ukrainian Democracy (PDF). Nations in Transit. Freedom House.
  • Mierzejewski-Voznyak, Melanie (2018). "Nationalism (s) in a Structural-Historical Context". The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-027456-6.
  • Sakwa, Richard (2015). "Peace and War". Frontline Ukraine. Crisis in Borderlands. London: I. B. Tauris. ISBN 978-0-85773-804-2.
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