Stanford, California, United States Contact Info
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About

The Economics of Technology Professor at Stanford Graduate School of Business. Recipient…

Experience & Education

  • Stanford Graduate School of Business

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Volunteer Experience

  • Board Member

    Newtowne School

    - 1 year 9 months

    Education

    Member of board of Newtowne School.

Publications

  • Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations

    Theoretical Economics

    We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade can be supported in each period if the discount factor is at least one half. In contrast, when the budget must balance ex post, efficiency is not attainable, and furthermore for a wide range of probability…

    We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade can be supported in each period if the discount factor is at least one half. In contrast, when the budget must balance ex post, efficiency is not attainable, and furthermore for a wide range of probability distributions over their valuations, the traders can do no better than employing a posted price mechanism in each period. Between these extremes, we consider a "bank" that allows the traders to accumulate budget imbalances over time, but only within a bounded range. We construct non-stationary equilibria that allow traders to receive payoffs that approach efficiency as their discount factor approaches one, while the bank earns exactly zero expected profits. For some probability distributions there exist equilibria that yield exactly efficient payoffs for the players and zero profits for the bank, but such equilibria require high discount factors.

    Other authors

Patents

Honors & Awards

  • Elected Member

    National Academy of Science

    Elected Member of the National Academy of Science. Typically 1-2 economists each year are elected. Election to the NAS is one of the highest honors available to an American scientist.

  • 100 Most Creative People in Business

    Fast Company

  • Honorary Degree

    Duke University

  • Elected Member

    American Academy of Arts and Sciences

  • Young Global Leader

    World Economic Forum

  • John Bates Clark Medal

    American Economics Association

    Given to the American Economist under the age of 40 who is judged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge.
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Bates_Clark_Medal

  • Fellow

    Econometric Society

  • Top 100 under 50 Diverse Executives

    Diversity MBA

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